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Trial Practice and Procedure
by Kate S. Cook*
Brandon L. Peak**
I***
John C. Morrison
Tedra C. Hobson****
Mary K. Weeks"'..
and Jeb Butler******
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article addresses several significant cases and legislation of
interest to the Georgia civil trial practitioner occurring during the
survey period of this publication.'

* Of Counsel in the firm of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, LLP, Columbus and Atlanta,
Georgia. University of the South (BA, magna cur laude, 1998); Mercer University,
Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., magna cur laude, 2002). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, LLP, Columbus and Atlanta,
Georgia. The Citadel (B.S., summa cur laude, 2001); Mercer University, Walter F. George
School of Law (J.D., magna cur laude, 2004). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, LLP, Columbus and Atlanta,
Georgia. Mercer University (B.A., magna cur laude, 2003); Mercer University, Walter F.
George School of Law (J.D., magna cur laude, 2006). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
**** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, LLP, Columbus and Atlanta,
Georgia. Emory University (BA, 2000); Georgetown Public Policy Institute (M.P.P., 2004);
University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., magna cur laude, 2007). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
*****

Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, LLP, Columbus and Atlanta,

Georgia. University of Kentucky (B.A., summa cum laude, 1999); Mercer University,
Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., magna cur laude, 2007). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
****** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten & Fryhofer, LLP, Columbus and Atlanta,
Georgia. Vanderbilt University (B.A., cum laude, 2004); University of Georgia School of
Law (J.D., magna cur laude, 2008). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia trial practice and procedure during the prior survey
period, see Kate S. Cook et al., Trial Practice and Procedure, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 63 MERCER L. REv. 359 (2011).
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LEGISLATION

On May 1, 2012, the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act
(UIDDA)2 was approved.' The UIDDA, which will survive with the
new 2013 evidence code, provides for a streamlined foreign subpoena
process if the subpoena's forum state has also adopted the UIDDA.4
Additionally, the UIDDA was drafted so that documents may be
subpoenaed without the need for an accompanying definition, should a
practitioner so choose.5
The Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) section 9-11-4(c)(5)
has been amended to strike the qualification that a certified process
server qualified under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4.17 can only be used in counties
whose sheriffs allow for such process servers. 8 Among other revisions,
House Bill No. 665' now allows court clerks to store depositions or
discovery filed in cases that have reached final disposition in microfilm
or digital format. 10
On April 17, 2012, House Bill No. 39711 was signed into law. 2 This
bill substantially rewrites Georgia's Open Records Act,'3 allowing, inter
alia, for a clearer and more streamlined process of obtaining records, 4
reducing the per-page cost of receiving requested records,' 5 requiring
civil litigants to notify opposing counsel for a state agency of such open
record requests, 6 and increasing fines for violations. 7

2.

Ga. H.R. Bill 46, Reg. Sess. (2012) (codified at O.C.GA. §§ 24-13-110 to -116 (Supp.

2012)).
3. Id. § 3-2.
4. O.C.G. § 24-13-112.
5. O.C.G.A §§ 24-10-111(5) (Supp. 2012), 24-13-111(5) (Supp. 2012).
6. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(cX5) (Supp. 2012).
7. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4.1 (Supp. 2012).
8. Ga. H.R. Bill 1048, Reg. Sess. (2012); O.C.GA §§ 9-11-4(c)(5), 9-11-4.1.
9. Ga. H.R. Bill 665, Reg. Sess. (2012) (codified at O.C.GA § 9-11-29.1(c) (Supp.
2012)).
10. Id. § 1-1.
11. Ga. H.R. Bill 397, Reg. Sess. (2012) (codified in scattered sections of O.C.GA. tit.
50 (Supp. 2012)).
12.
13.
14.

Id. § 19.
O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70 to -77 (2009 & Supp. 2012).
Ga. H.R. Bill 397 § 2; O.C.GA § 50-18-70 (2009).

15. Ga. H.R. Bill 397 § 2; O.C.GA § 50-18-71 (2009).
16. Ga. H.R. Bill 397 § 2; O.C.GA. § 50-18-71(e) (2009).
17. Ga. H.R. Bill 397 § 2; O.C.G. §§ 50-14-6 (2009), 50-18-74 (2009).
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CASE LAW

A.

Choice of Law
In Andrews v. RAM Medical, Inc.,"5 the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia, applying Georgia law, was required
to decide-in the absence of a clear bright-line rule or consistent Georgia
precedent-whether breach of warranty claims arise under tort or under
contract for choice of law purposes. 9 The court determined that
because the claims of the plaintiff were based on personal injuries
sustained as the result of the use of a defective medical product, the
claims sounded in tort.20 The court therefore applied the Georgia
choice of law rules for tort claims and found that the law of Georgia
would apply to the case.2 1 The court's decision had the effect of barring
the plaintiff's breach of warranty claims because the plaintiff was unable
to establish the requisite privity needed to recover under Georgia law.22
B. Jurisdiction
In Amerireach.com LLC v. Walker,' the Georgia Supreme Court held
as a matter of first impression that the "fiduciary shield" doctrine would
not apply in Georgia.24 The plaintiff, a Georgia physician, had been
selling nutritional supplements purchased through Amerireach.com, a
multi-level distribution company as defined by Georgia law.' When
Amerireach.com refused to repurchase certain products from her, the
plaintiff filed a damages suit in the State Court of Gwinnett County,26
alleging that Amerireach.com and three of its corporate officers violated
the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act 2" and the Sale of Business
Opportunities Act.28 After disposing of the plaintiff's claims against the
corporate defendant on different grounds, 9 the court turned to whether
18. No. 7:11-CV-147 (BL), 2012 WL 1358495 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 19, 2012).
19. Id. at *2.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at *3.
23. 290 Ga. 261, 719 S.E.2d 489 (2011).
24. Id. at 265-66, 719 S.E.2d at 493-94.
25. Id. at 261-62, 719 S.E.2d at 491; see also O.C.GA § 10-1-410(6) (2009).
26. Walker, 290 Ga. at 261-62, 719 S.E.2d at 491; O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-415, -417.
27. O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-390 to -407 (2009 & Supp. 2012).
28. O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-410 to -417 (2009).
29. The Georgia Supreme Court first held that the plaintiffs claims against the
corporate defendant were barred by a Texas court's ruling in a declaratory judgment action
filed by Amerireach.com. Walker, 290 Ga. at 264, 719 S.E.2d at 492-93. The Texas court
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the individual defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction in
Georgia." The individual defendants took the position that they were
entitled to assert the "fiduciary shield" doctrine, under which "a
nonresident individual cannot be subject to personal jurisdiction in
Georgia courts based solely upon acts taken in his capacity as a
corporate officer."3 ' Although the court noted that several Georgia
Court of Appeals cases and federal courts have applied the "fiduciary
shield" doctrine, the supreme court disapproved of the doctrine and
overruled or declined to follow those cases, observing that any "special
treatment" the doctrine would afford corporate officers and directors
conflicted with the "literal language" of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1),"2 the
Georgia long-arm statute.3
The court was careful to note, however, that while the individual
defendants' respective statuses as corporate officers did not necessarily
shield them from personal jurisdiction, such status did not automatically
confer personal jurisdiction over them." Instead, the court determined
that the liability of corporate officers and directors could be resolved only
by analyzing their individual contacts with the forum state.' Accordingly, the court held that the "minimum contacts" personal jurisdiction
test for non-resident corporate officers and directors can be satisfied by
a showing that each individual officer is a "primary participant[] in the
activities forming the basis ofjurisdiction over" the corporation and that
"the cause of action arises from or is connected with such act or
transaction."3s
In Jordan Outdoor Enterprises, Ltd. v. That 70's Store, LLC,17 a
federal district court rejected a plaintiff's attempt to broaden the scope

had held that the plaintiffs damages suit was subject to an enforceable forum selection
clause in the parties' contract, which required any such suit to be brought in Texas. Id.
at 262, 719 S.E.2d at 491.
30. Id. at 264, 719 S.E.2d at 493.
31. Id.
32. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1) (2007 & Supp. 2012).
33. Walker, 290 Ga. at 265-66, 719 S.E.2d at 493-94; O.C.G-. § 9-10-91(1). The court
expressly overruled Southern ElectronicsDistributorsv. Anderson, 232 Ga. App. 648, 502
S.E.2d 257 (1998) and Girard v. Weiss, 160 Ga. App. 295, 287 S.E.2d 301 (1981). Walker,
290 Ga. at 266, 719 S.E.2d at 494.
34. Walker, 290 Ga. at 266, 719 S.E.2d at 494.
35. Id. (noting that "the contacts of the individual defendants with Georgia are not to
be judged according to AmeriSciences' activities in this state").
36. Id. at 269-70, 719 S.E.2d at 496 (quoting Aero Toy Store v. Grieves, 279 Ga. App.
515, 517, 631 S.E.2d 734, 737 (2006)). The court further noted that its "analysis is not
altered by the status of the individual defendants as members of a limited liability
company (LLC)." Id. at 268, 719 S.E.2d at 495.
37. 819 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (M.D. Ga. 2011).
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of personal jurisdiction in Georgia by invoking "the due process personal
jurisdiction test' expressed in Calder v. Joties [465 U.S. 783 (1984)] and
Licciandello v. Loveland [544 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2008)]. "38 The
plaintiff, owner of various copyrights and trademarks for "REALTREE"
brand camouflage patterns, sued the defendants, which marketed items
featuring a marijuana leaf camouflage pattern and using marks such as
"REALBUD." The defendants marketed their products through two
websites that were accessible in Georgia, but it was undisputed that the
defendants had no physical presence in Georgia and neither website had
generated any sales of the "REALBUD" products in Georgia.3" The
court first rejected plaintiff's argument that federal case law expanded
Georgia's long-arm statute to include personal jurisdiction coextensive
with the limits of due process and then held that the plaintiff failed to
meet any of the express requirements of Georgia's long-arm statute.4"
Specifically, the court determined that the defendants did not transact
any business in Georgia by either committing an intentional tort
directed at the plaintiff in Georgia or by operating websites "accessible
everywhere and not specifically in Georgia"; the defendants did not
commit a tortious act in Georgia by displaying the "REALBUD" marks
on websites accessible in Georgia; and they did not regularly "solicit
business in Georgiasolely by operating a website that is accessible here
and everywhere else."4 1
C. Remand /Removal
In Goins v. City of Quitman,4 2 the district court addressed an
apparent issue of first impression under Georgia law: which date of
dismissal should control "in a renewal action when federal and state
claims have been dismissed at different times."43 The plaintiffs filed a
complaint alleging both state and federal claims. After first voluntarily
dismissing the federal claims on June 30, 2010, the plaintiffs dismissed
the case in its entirety on February 3, 2011. The plaintiffs then fied a
second complaint re-alleging both the federal and state claims on August
3, 2011, arguing that the date of the action's ultimate dismissal should
control because O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a) allows for a six-month grace period
for the refiling of a dismissed case that would otherwise be time-

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 1345-46.
Id. at 1340-41.
Id. at 1341-42, 1346.
Id. at 1342-45 (emphasis in original).
No. 7:11-CV-117 (HI), 2012 WL 39638 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 2012).
Id. at *2; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 (2007).
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barred." While acknowledging the broad remedial purpose of O.C.G.A.
§ 9-2-61, the district court held that the six months accrues from the
date of a claim's dismissal, rather than the ultimate dismissal of the
action.'
D. Statutes of Limitation
In Tindall v. H&S Homes, LLC, 46 the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia made clear that a plaintiff who sought
to recover general compensatory damages for mental anguish, pain, and
suffering as the result of an intentional tort was not in fact asserting a
wholly independent tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 4 ' Thus, the plaintiff's claims for mental anguish damages
resulting from the defendant's fraud were subject to the four-year fraud
statute of limitations rather than the two-year personal injury statute
of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. 4
In Infinite Energy, Inc. v. Pardue," the plaintiff filed his defamation
and slander lawsuit on the first anniversary of the allegedly tortious
misconduct.50 The defendant contended the action was barred by the
one-year statute of limitations for injuries to reputation,5 1 relying on
Jacobs v. Shaw,5" which held that such claims are "'untimely if brought
on the anniversary date of the alleged publication or thereafter."'53 The
Georgia Court of Appeals noted that Jacobs and similar cases relied on
an outdated version of O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(dX3),5 4 which had required the
date of the injury to be included in the calculation of the statute of
limitations.5" The current version of O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(d)(3), in contrast,
specifically provides that "when a period of time measured in days,
weeks, months, years, or other measurements of time except hours is
prescribed for the exercise of any privilege or the discharge of any duty,
56
the first day shall not be counted but the last day shall be counted.

44. Goins, 2012 WL 39638, at *1-2.
45. Id. at *2-3.
46. No. 5:10-CV-044 (CAR), 2011 WL 5007827 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 20, 2011).
47. Id. at *1.
48. Id. at *4-5.
49. 310 Ga. App. 355, 713 S.E.2d 456 (2011) (en banc).
50. Id. at 362, 713 S.E.2d at 463.
51. O.C.G-. § 9-3-33 (2007).
52. 219 Ga. App. 425, 465 S.E.2d 460 (1995).
53. Pardue, 310 Ga. App. at 362, 713 S.E.2d at 463 (quoting Jacobs, 219 Ga. App. at
427, 465 S.E.2d at 463).
54. O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(d)(3) (2000 & Supp. 2012).
55. Pardue, 310 Ga. App. at 362-63, 713 S.E.2d at 463-64.
56. O.C.GA § 1-3-1(dX3).
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Because the first day should not have been counted when calculating the
applicable statute of limitations, the court'held that the complaint "was
timely filed on the first anniversary of the date of publication," and
overruled the two cases which conflicted with the court's ruling.5"
E.

Causation
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(dX2) disallows a finding of proximate cause
between a police chase and any injuries of a person hurt during that
chase "unless the law enforcement officer acted with reckless disregard
for proper law enforcement procedures in the officer's decision to initiate
or continue the pursuit." " In Strength v. Lovett, 6 the court of
appeals disapproved its previous analysis in Pearson v. City of Atlanta,61 and clarified that "[the relevant conduct [at issue] is the decision
of the [officer] to initiate or continue the pursuit,
not how he drove his
own vehicle during the course of the pursuit." 2
F

Claims
In Boller v. Robert W. Woodruff Arts Center, Inc.,63 the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant's failure to provide reasonably prompt
medical care to her husband caused his death after he suffered a heart
attack while attending an outdoor concert organized by the defendant."
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary

57. Pardue,310 Ga. App. at 363, 713 S.E.2d at 464 (expressly overruling Jacobs, 219
Ga. App. at 427, 465 S.E.2d at 463 and McCandliss v. Cox Enters., 265 Ga. App. 377, 380,
593 S.E.2d 856, 859 (2004)).
58. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(dX2) (2011).
59. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d)(2) states:
When a law enforcement officer in a law enforcement vehicle is pursuing a fleeing
suspect in another vehicle and the fleeing suspect damages any property or injures
or kills any person during the pursuit, the law enforcement officer's pursuit shall
not be the proximate cause or a contributing proximate cause of the damage,
injury, or death caused by the fleeing suspect unless the law enforcement officer
acted with reckless disregardfor proper law enforcement proceduresin the officer's
decision to initiateor continue the pursuit.Where such reckless disregard exists,
the pursuit may be found to constitute a proximate cause of the damage, injury,
or death caused by the fleeing suspect, but the existence of such reckless disregard
shall not in and of itself establish causation.
Id. (emphasis added).
60. 311 Ga. App. 35, 714 S.E.2d 723 (2011).
61. 231 Ga. App. 96, 499 S.E.2d 89 (1998).
62. Strength, 311 Ga. App. at 43, 714 S.E.2d at 730.
63. 311 Ga. App. 693, 716 S.E.2d 713 (2011).
64. Id. at 694-95, 716 S.E.2d at 715.
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judgment to the defendant.6 5 After rejecting the plaintiff's tort-based
contentions that the defendant owed a duty to the decedent,66 the court
also held that decedent could not have been a third-party beneficiary of
a contract which required the defendant to "manage and operate the
[Amphitheatre] in a manner consistent with the management principles
of professional entertainment facilities and in accordance with existing
City and State of Georgia policies, procedures, laws and ordinances." 7
The court held that the contract "contains no language reflecting an
intent to confer a direct benefit on any patrons or attendees of the
concerts held at the Amphitheatre," and therefore "the evidence does not
support a finding that the decedent was a third-party beneficiary" of the
contract.68
The court of appeals examined the informed consent provisions of
Georgia law in Roberts v. Connell.69 The plaintiff in that case suffered
a laceration to her lip when an instrument slipped during a dental
procedure.70 The plaintiff asserted that she had two separate claims:
first, the dentist had a common law duty to obtain her informed consent
regarding the risks inherent in her dental procedure, and, second, the
dentist had a statutory obligation to obtain her informed consent
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 31-9-6.1. 71 The court quickly disposed of the
plaintiff's first claim, noting that the supreme court had already held
"that Georgia does not recognize a common law duty to inform patients
of the material risks of a proposed treatment or procedure."72 The
court also rejected the plaintiff's contention that her dental procedure
required "major regional anesthesia," and therefore required the
defendant to obtain her informed consent pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 31-9-

65. Id. at 693, 716 S.E.2d at 714.
66. The court held that the defendant "owed no duty to provide emergency medical
services to the decedent" and that the actions of the defendant in rendering aid to the
decedent fell within the scope of Georgia's "Good Samaritan" statute, O.C.GA. § 51-1-29.
Boiler, 311 Ga. App. at 696-97, 716 S.E.2d at 716-17; see also O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29 (2000).
The court also rejected the plaintiffs premises-liability based contentions that the
defendant had a duty to recognize and mitigate the hazard presented by its concert and
that it had superior knowledge of a dangerous condition existing at the concert. Boiler, 311
Ga. App. at 697, 716 S.E.2d at 717.
67. Boller, 311 Ga. App. at 698, 716 S.E.2d at 717 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
68. Id. at 698, 716 S.E.2d at 718.
69. 312 Ga. App. 515, 517-19, 718 S.E.2d 862, 864-65 (2011).
70. Id. at 515, 718 S.E.2d at 863.
71. Id. at 517-18, 718 S.E.2d at 864-65; O.C.GA. § 31-9-6.1 (2012).
72. Roberts, 312 Ga. App. at 518, 718 S.E.2d at 864.
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6.1.73 The court noted that it had previously held that the mouth and
jaw were not "major region[s]" of the body."4
A case featured in last year's survey, Flores v. Exprezit! Stores 98Georgia, LLC, 5 made another appearance this year in the Georgia
courts.76 Flores involved a horrific wreck in which a drunk driver, Billy
Joe Grundell, struck a van, killing six people and seriously injuring
others. Grundell was alleged to have purchased alcohol at the defendant's convenience store while noticeably intoxicated, in violation of
the Georgia Dram Shop Act (GDSA).7" During last year's survey
period, the court of appeals, presuming that the plaintiffs had shown a
prima facie case under the GDSA, 9 affirmed the trial court's granting
of summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the grounds that the
GDSA did not apply to sales of packaged alcohol."0 The supreme court
reversed and returned the case to the court of apppeals to address the
remaining enumerations of error in the case stemming from the trial
court's alternative finding that the plaintiffs had not produced sufficient
evidence of the defendant's sale of alcohol to Grundell, or that such sale
was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.8 ' Although the
defendant's employee denied selling Grundell any alcohol, the plaintiffs
produced evidence that Grundell "entered the store and shortly
thereafter exited the store carrying packaged beer."2 The court of
appeals determined that this evidence was sufficient to create a jury
issue regarding whether the convenience store sold Grundell alcohol.'
The court of appeals also held that testimony evidence indicating that
Grundell consumed a portion of the beer he purchased, appeared
intoxicated, and had a blood-alcohol level in excess of the legal limit was
sufficient to create a jury issue as to whether defendant's sale of alcohol

73. Id. at 518-19, 718 S.E.2d at 865 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id. at 519, 718 S.E.2d at 865 (quoting Thompson v. Princell, 304 Ga. App. 256,259,

696 S.E.2d 91, 95 (2010) ("INleither the mouth nor the jaw is considered a major region
75. 304 Ga. App. 333,336,696 S.E.2d 125, 128(2010). For further discussion, see Cook
et al., supra note 1, at 370-71.
76. Flores v. Exprezit! Stores 98-Georgia, LLC, 314 Ga. App. 570, 724 S.E.2d 870
(2012).
77. Id. at 571, 724 S.E.2d at 872.
78. O.C.GA § 51-1-40 (2000).
79. Flores, 304 Ga. App. at 334, 336, 696 S.E.2d at 126, 128.
80. Flores v. Exprezit! Stores 98-Georgia, LLC, 289 Ga. 466, 470-71, 713 S.E.2d 368,
371-72 (2011).
81. Flores, 314 Ga. App. at 572, 724 S.E.2d at 872.
82. Id. at 573, 724 S.E.2d at 873.
83. Id.
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to Grundell was a proximate cause of the wreck at issue.8 The court
did, however, affirm the trial court's conclusion that the defendant did
not spoliate evidence when, in the ordinary course of business, the
defendant destroyed surveillance video and sales records that could have
evidenced the sale of alcohol to Grundell, noting that the defendant "had
no notice that the [plaintiffs] were contemplating litigation when the
evidence was discarded." s8
In Illinois Union Insurance Co. v. NRI Construction, Inc.,' a painter
sustained injuries when he fell from a ladder while working on a
construction project for which NRI was the general contractor. The
painter subsequently filed a personal injury suit against several
defendants, including NRI. NRI provided its insurer, Illinois Union,
with notice of the painter's accident once NRI had been served with the
personal injury complaint-nearly two years after the accident. Illinois
Union defended NRI under a reservation of rights, but it also filed a
declaratory judgment action requesting a declaration that it had no duty
to defend or indemnify NRI and seeking
reimbursement for the expenses
87
it had incurred in NRI's defense.
The court of appeals first determined that NRI did not timely notify
Illinois Union of the accident involving the painter, rejecting NRI's
contention that earlier notification was not necessary because NRI
believed it was not liable for the painter's injuries.ce The court then
determined that the reservation of rights letter was sufficient to inform
NRI of Illinois Union's coverage reservations, and by failing to object and
permitting the defense to go forward, NRI would be deemed to have
consented to the terms in the letter.89 Next, the court turned to an
issue of first impression under Georgia law: whether NRI's "implied
consent to [the] reservation of rights letter means that NRI is bound by
the terms of that letter, which included a right to recoup defense expenses.' ° After noting a split in the authority on this issue, the court
concluded that Georgia would most likely follow the majority view, which
would permit an insurer to seek reimbursement of costs incurred in
defending under a reservation of rights where the insurer "(1) timely and
explicitly reserved its right to recoup the costs; and (2) provided specific

84. Id.
85. Id. at 573-74, 724 S.E.2d at 873-74.
86. 846 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
87. Id. at 1369-70.
88. Id. at 1371-72.
89. Id. at 1373.
90. Id. at 1374. The insurance policy at issue does not appear to have had a
reimbursement provision. See id.
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and adequate notice of the possibility of reimbursement."9' Because
Illinois Union met those requirements,
the court held that it was entitled
92
to recoup its defense costs.
In Villanueva v. First American Title Insurance Co.," the court of
appeals determined, as a matter of first impression, that most legal
malpractice claims are more aligned with property rights rather than
personal tort or fraud actions 'and, therefore, may generally be assigned.94
Damages and Remedies
In McReynolds v. Krebs,95 the supreme court further clarified the
apportionment provisions of the Tort Reform Act of 2005,96 codified at
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33." 7 The appellate courts again98 wrestled with the
question of whether apportionment among persons at fault is appropriate even when the plaintiff bears no fault.99 The court held that trial
courts must apportion damages "'among the persons Who are liable
according to the percentage of fault of each person' even if the plaintiff
is not at fault for the injury or damages claimed."0 0 Unlike the court
G.

of appeals,'

the supreme court did not find it necessary to consider

legislative intent in reading the statute, but instead held that apportionment under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b) "is plainly meant to apply even if
there is no plaintiff fault and, hence,
no reduction of damages for
" 1 02
plaintiff fault under subsection (a).
Based on the supreme court's holding in McReynolds, it is difficult to
imagine an instance where defendants may be held jointly and severally
liable. Although two statutes 3 remain on the books contemplating
joint and several liability, those statutes have been rendered vestigial.

91. Id. at 1377.
92. Id.
93. 313 Ga. App. 164, 721 S.E.2d 150 (2011), cert. granted.
94. Id. at 168-69, 721 S.E.2d at 155.
95. 290 Ga. 850, 725 S.E.2d 584 (2012) ("McReynolds 11").
96. Ga. S. Bill 3, Reg. Sess. (2005).
97. McReynolds II, 290 Ga. at 852-53, 725 S.E.2d at 587-88.
98. See Cavalier Convenience, Inc. v. Sarvis, 305 Ga. App. 141,699 S.E.2d 104 (2010),
cert. granted.
99. McReynolds II, 290 Ga. at 850-52, 725 S.E.2d at 586-87.
100. Id. at 852, 725 S.E.2d at 587; see also O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b) (2000 & Supp. 2012).
101. McReynolds v. Krebs, 307 Ga. App. 330, 333, 705 S.E.2d 214, 217 (2010)
("McReynolds F).
102. McReynolds II, 290 Ga. at 852, 725 S.E.2d at 587.
103. O.C.GA. §§ 51-12-31 to -32 (2000 & Supp. 2012).
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In ConAgra Foods Food Ingredients Co. v. Georgia Farm Services,
the district court held that a plaintiff cannot recover prejudgment
interest when a jury awards nominal damages instead of actual
damages.' °5 The court relied on the language of O.C.G.A. § 13-613,06 which allows recovery of prejudgment interest only when the
damages are "an amount ascertained... at the time of the breach."' 07
Because a "nominal damage award cannot be classified as ascertainable
08
at the time of breach," prejudgment interest is not appropriate.
H.

Attorney Fees
Overruling Slone v. Myers,09 the court of appeals held in Reeves v.
Upson Regional Medical Center"' that attorney fees under O.C.G.A.
§ 9-15-14(b)"' may only be awarded to a party."2 In Reeves, the
trial court awarded attorney fees to Upson Regional Medical Center, a
non-party in the underlying lawsuit that was served with a subpoena.
The attorney who had served the subpoena appealed the award,
appearing pro se before the court of appeals." 3
The court of appeals relied on subsection (d) of the statute to decide
that attorney fees under subsection (b) may only be awarded to a
party."4 Subsection (d) limits awards to an amount that is "reasonable and necessary for defending or asserting the rights of a party."" 5
The court concluded that fees and expenses incurred by a non-party to
the underlying litigation "in the defense or assertion of its own rights
are not, by definition, fees and expenses 'which are reasonable
and
' 6
necessary for defending or asserting the rights of a party.' M
In a footnote, the court lamented that a mere motion to quash may not
provide complete relief to a non-party responding to an "unreasonable or

104. No. 1-09-CV-00167 (WLS), 2012 WL 610749 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 24, 2012).
105. Id. at *5.

106. O.C.G.A. § 13-6-13 (2010).
107.
108.

ConAgra, 2012 WL 610749, at *1; O.C.GConAgra, 2012 WL 610749, at *4.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

288 Ga. App. 8, 653 S.E.2d 323 (2007).
315 Ga. App. 582, 726 S.E.2d 544 (2012).
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) (2010).
Reeves, 315 Ga. App. at 582, 726 S.E.2d at 545.
Id. at 582-83, 726 S.E.2d at 545.
Id. at 585-87, 726 S.E.2d at 547-48; O.C.GA § 9-15-14.
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(d).
Reeves, 315 Ga. App. at 586-87, 726 S.E.2d at 548; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(d).

§ 13-6-13.
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oppressive subpoena." 17 Instead, "[ilf a more complete remedy is to
be made available, it must be done by the General Assembly."1 '
With all due respect to the court of appeals, the Civil Practice Act" 9
already contains significant safeguards for subpoena recipients. First,
under Rule 45(a)(2), 121 simply serving written objections to a subpoena
totally halts the process.'' In that case, the subpoena recipient need
not do anything unless and until the party serving the subpoena obtains
an order from the court. 1 22 If the subpoena is truly unreasonable and
oppressive, the serving party will likely be unwilling to ask the court to
grant an order based on it. Nevertheless, even if a non-party incurs
expenses responding to such an unreasonable subpoena, Rule 26123
provides additional safeguards." 2 Rule 26(c)(1) allows the court to
"make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense."'25 Such an order could require the payment of fees and
expenses by the party propounding the subpoena. If the subpoena
recipient in Reeves had asked for relief under Rule 26 instead of
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b), the award may have been upheld.
I. Jury and Trial
In Mayor & Aldermen of the City of Savannah v. Batson-Cook Co.,' 26
the supreme court overruled at least seven prior court of appeals
opinions 2 7 to hold that a trial court's determination of a motion to
recuse brought under Uniform Superior Court Rule 25.31"8 must be
assessed by an appellate court using a de novo, not abuse of discretion,
standard of review.' 9

117. Reeves, 315 Ga. App. at 587 n.9, 726 S.E.2d at 548 n.9.
118. Id.
119. O.C.GA ch. 9-11 (2006).
120. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-45(aX2) (2006).

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. O.C.GA § 9-11-26 (2006).
124. See id.
125. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(c).
126. 291 Ga. 114, 728 S.E.2d 189 (2012).
127. See id. at 119-20, 728 S.E.2d at 194. See also Moore v. State, 313 Ga. App. 519,
722 S.E.2d 160 (2012); Grant v. State, 304 Ga. App. 133,695 S.E.2d 420 (2010); Ga. Kidney
& Hypertension Specialists, Inc. v. Fresenius USA Marketing, Inc., 291 Ga. App. 429, 662
S.E.2d 245 (2008); Adams v. State, 290 Ga. App. 299, 659 S.E.2d 711 (2008); Keller v.
State, 286 Ga. App. 292, 648 S.E.2d 714 (2007); Hill v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 283
Ga. App. 15, 640 S.E.2d 638 (2006); In re J.E.T., 269 Ga. App. 567, 604 S.E.2d 623 (2004).
128. GA. SUPER. CT. R. 25.3.
129. Batson-Cook, 291 Ga. at 119, 728 S.E.2d at 193-94.
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In Jerome Road, LLC v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co.,' the court
of appeals overruled Lanier v. Citizens State Bank 31 and held that a
trial court may exercise its discretion when deciding whether to include
findings and conclusions in a bench judgment when a party has only
requested them after the entry of judgment. 3 2 The court of appeals
determined that cases such as Lanier, which were cited for the
proposition that the trial court erred by not including specific findings
and conclusions when requested, were inapplicable to this issue and
should be overruled because those cases were decided before O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-5213 was amended to no longer mandate the inclusion of such
findings and conclusions.lu
In Grant v. Kooby,3 5 the court of appeals clarified that O.C.G.A. § 56-48(c)'s13 6 "requirement that [a] trial court may not dismiss an appeal
[for failure to pay costs] until first providing the parties with 'notice and
an opportunityfor hearing' is 'satisfied if the [complaining] party is given
37
an opportunity to respond on the record to the motion to dismiss."
In ruling this, the court of appeals abrogated its prior opinion of
McCorvey Development, Inc. v. D.G. Jenkins Development Corp.8 8
J.

Affidavits, Evidence, and Testimony

In Raines v. Maughan,3 9 the court of appeals held that a trial court
may validly exercise its discretion in a negligent security case to exclude
expert testimony as to whether the subject incident was foreseeable and
whether inadequate security proximately caused the subject incident.4 ° In Raines, the plaintiff's expert first sought to opine that the
pattern of crime in the area of the apartment complex where a murder
occurred was sufficient to make the murder foreseeable. Second, the
expert sought to opine that the inadequacy of security proximately

130.
131.
132.

312 Ga. App. 583, 718 S.E.2d 913 (2011).
186 Ga. App. 395, 367 S.E.2d 585 (1988).
Jerome Road, LLC, 312 Ga. App. at 584-85, 718 S.E.2d at 914-15.

133.

O.C.GA. § 9-11-52 (2006).

134. Jerome Road, LLC, 312 Ga. App. at 584-85, 718 S.E.2d at 914-15; see also
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52.
135. 310 Ga. App. 483, 713 S.E.2d 685 (2011).
136. O.C.GA. § 5-6-48(c) (1995 & Supp. 2012).
137. Grant, 310 Ga. App. at 486, 713 S.E.2d at 688 (alteration in original) (quoting
Mitchell v. Peachtree 1, LLC, 285 Ga. 576,576,678 S.E.2d 880,881 (2009)); O.C.G.A. § 5-6-

48(c).
138.
v. D.G.
139.
140.

See Grant, 310 Ga. App. at 486, 713 S.E.2d at 688; see also McCorvey Dev., Inc.,
Jenkins Dev. Corp., 260 Ga. App. 276, 581 S.E.2d 308 (2003).
312 Ga. App. 303, 718 S.E.2d 135 (2011).
Id. at 308, 718 S.E.2d at 139.
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caused the murder. The trial court excluded both opinions. After the
trial court entered judgment on a defense verdict, the plaintiff appealed.'
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court could,
within its discretion, conclude that the jury could reach both conclusions
without the aid of expert testimony.'
In so holding, the court
reaffirmed that while experts coxild validly opine "even [on] the ultimate
issue," a trial court had the discretion to exclude such
testimony if "the
14
jury could reach the same conclusion on its own."
In Dendy v. Wells,'" the court of appeals held that an expert in a
medical malpractice case could validly testify as to his personal practices
on either direct or cross-examination without regard to whether the
expert's personal practice mirrored or contradicted the standard of care
he espoused.145 In Dendy, the defense expert testified on direct
examination, as to the standard of care in hip replacement surgery, that
the defendant-doctor did not violate the standard of care, and that the
4
expert's personal practice was consistent with that standard of care.'
After the trial
court entered judgment on a defense verdict, the plaintiff
147
appealed.

The court of appeals affirmed, basing its decision on the supreme
court's decision in Condra v. Atlanta OrthopaedicGroup.'" In Condra,
the supreme court, citing a 1999 version of this very Article,' 49 held
that an expert in a medical malpractice case could be cross-examined on
discrepancies between his personal practices and the standard of care he
espoused.150 Applying Condra, the court in Dendy held that "we see
no logical distinction between allowing an expert to be cross-examined
about whether his personal practices differed from the defendant's and
allowing the expert to testify on direct examination about whether his
personal practices mirrored the defendant's, and comported with the
previously-established standard of care."' 5 ' The court further con-

141. Id. at 303-04, 307, 718 S.E.2d at 136, 139.
142. Id. at 308, 718 S.E.2d at 139.
143. Id. at 307, 718 S.E.2d at 139.
144. 312 Ga. App. 309, 718 S.E.2d 140 (2011).
145. Id. at 314, 718 S.E.2d at 144.
146. Id. at 312, 718 S.E.2d at 142-43.
147. Id. at 310, 718 S.E.2d at 141.
148. Id. at 314, 718 S.E.2d at 144; Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic Grp., 285 Ga. 667,
681 S.E.2d 152 (2009).
149. See C. Fredrick Overby et al., Trial Practice and Procedure,Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, 51 MERCER L. REv. 487, 501-02 (1999).
150. Condra, 285 Ga. at 672, 681 S.E.2d at 155-56.
151. Dendy, 312 Ga. App. at 314, 718 S.E.2d at 144 (emphasis in original).
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firmed that although an expert's testimony about his personal practices
was relevant,
it could not, by itself, "establishthe applicable standard of
152
care."
In Griffin Industries, Inc. v. Georgia Department of Agriculture,'53
the court of appeals held that a public entity may, consistent with the
Georgia Open Records Act (GORA),1 4 refuse to produce e-mails that
have been reduced to storage on backup tapes without first collecting
substantial payment from the requesting party.155 In Griffin Industries, a plaintiff-corporation sued the Georgia Department of Agriculture
(the Department) to compel the production of, inter alia, e-mails about
the plaintiff-corporation.'56 The Department refused, stating that the
e-mails had been stored on backup tapes that were difficult to access,
that some of the backup tapes had been written over, and that the
57
records were therefore not "reasonably available for searching."
When the plaintiff challenged the Department's response, "the Department provided an estimate ranging from $37,780 to $2,837,705, which
the Department would require [the plaintiff] to pay in order for the
Department to obtain e-mails that were placed on 31 backup tapes
.... 158

The Department moved for summary judgment. After the

trial court granted the Department's motion, the plaintiff appealed.5 9
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that under the GORA-specifically, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(b)-"all that is required of a public records
custodian is that he provide reasonable access to the files that are
sought." 6 ° The court concluded that because "the Department did not
maintain the purported e-mails on its system and would have to extract
them from backup tapes using a laborious compilation process, the
information sought by [the plaintiff] 'was not an existing pubic record,
and non-disclosure thereof did not violate the Act. '""' Under these
circumstances, the court held that the Department's refusal to produce

152. Id. (emphasis added).
153. 313 Ga. App. 69, 720 S.E.2d 212 (2011).
154. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70 to -77 (2009 & Supp. 2012).
155. Griffin Indus., Inc., 313 Ga. App. at 74-75, 720 S.E.2d at 216.
156. Id. at 70-71, 720 S.E.2d at 213-14.
157. Id. at 71, 720 S.E.2d at 214.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 72, 720 S.E.2d at 214-15.
160. Id. at 73, 720 S.E.2d at 215; O.C.GA § 50-18-70(b).
161. Griffin Indus., Inc., 313 Ga. App. at 74,720 S.E.2d at 216 (quoting Schulten, Ward
& Turner, LLP v. Fulton-Dekalb Hosp. Auth., 272 Ga. 725, 727, 535 S.E.2d 243, 245-46
(2000)).
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the e-mails without payment constituted "reasonable access to the
information sought" and was therefore permissible.162
K. Immunity
In Kyle v. Georgia Lottery Corp.,1" the supreme court sounded the
final death knell for Thomas v. Hospital Authority of Clarke County'"
and Jackson v. Georgia Lottery Corp.,' which addressed the distinctions between state agencies and instrumentalities for sovereign
immunity purposes."' Reiterating that the 1991 amendment to the
state constitution6 7 and the Georgia Tort Claims Act 68 disposed of
any differentiation between instrumentalities and agencies of the state,
the supreme court held that cases such as Thomas and Jackson, which
relied upon other case law predating the amendment,
had no application
69
to current sovereign immunity analysis.1
L. Arbitration/Settlement
In Hearn v. Dollar Rent a Car,Inc.,"' the court of appeals confirmed
that public policy does not require Medicare be listed as a co-payee on
an insurer's check to an injured claimant where the claimant acknowledges his responsibility to pay Medicare and indemnifies the releasing
parties as to medical liens, even if all parties know that Medicare has a
right to seek reimbursement.'17 In Hearn, viewing the facts most
favorably to the party against whom summary judgment was granted,
both the claimant and the insurer knew that Medicare had paid some of
the claimant's medical expenses and therefore had a right to reimbursement. 72 However, because Medicare had not yet asserted its right to
reimbursement, the claimant told the insurer that there was "no
lien." 173 The claimant and insurer then reached a settlement agreement in which the insurer would send a check to the claimant that did
not list Medicare as a co-payee, the claimant would acknowledge that
any Medicare liens were her responsibility, and the claimant would

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 75, 720 S.E.2d at 216.
290 Ga. 87, 718 S.E.2d 801 (2011).
264 Ga. 40, 440 S.E.2d 195 (1994).
228 Ga. App. 239, 491 S.E.2d 408 (1997).
Kyle, 290 Ga. at 90-91, 718 S.E.2d at 803-04.
GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, 9.
O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-20 to -37 (2009 & Supp. 2012).
Kyle, 290 Ga. at 89-91, 718 S.E.2d at 803-04.
315 Ga. App. 164, 726 S.E.2d 661 (2012).
Id. at 173, 726 S.E.2d at 668.
Id. at 166-67, 726 S.E.2d at 663-64.
Id. at 166, 726 S.E.2d at 663-64 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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indemnify the insurer against subsequent lien-related subrogation
expenses. However, when the insurer sent a check to the claimant, the
check listed Medicare as a co-payee. The claimant sued the insurer for
breach of a settlement agreement, and the insurer moved for summary
judgment. 74
The trial court granted the insurer's motion, concluding, inter alia,
that "it would not assist the 'Plaintiff to evade her duty to reimburse
Medicare' because doing so 'would clearly contravene the public policy in
' 7'
The court of appeals reversed, holding
favor of reimbursement.""
that "public policy does not preclude a court from enforcing an agreement to omit Medicare as a co-payee on a settlement check where, as
here, the plaintiff signed a release that acknowledged her responsibility
to pay any Medicare claim and agreed to indemnify the released
parties."' 76 The court expressly declined to opine as to "whether public
policy would be violated in the absence of an express acknowledgment
of liability and/or an indemnity agreement."'77 The Authors of this
Article suggest that in light of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-56.1,18 which establishes that insurers have no rights of reimbursement if a settlement
"does not fully and completely compensate the injured party," Georgia's
public policy expressly favors complete compensation rather than
"reimbursement" as the trial court suggested.'79
In Smith v. Hall,'8 ° the court of appeals held that an insurer may
validly accept an injured claimant's offer for settlement where the
claimant's offer says nothing about the release to be used, but the
insurer's response unequivocally accepts the offer and proposes a release
in language that is clearly precatory. 8 1 In Smith, the claimant sent
a time-limited offer of settlement to the insurer. Within the time limit,
the insurer sent the claimant two letters seeking clarification as to what
type of release the claimant preferred. The claimant did not respond but
did extend the deadline for acceptance." 2 Before the extended
deadline passed, the insurer acceded to the claimant's demand, sending
a check, expressly writing that it "accept[ed]" the demand, and enclosing
a proposed release and indemnity agreement, an affidavit of no liens,

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 166-68, 726 S.E.2d at 663-65.
Id. at 168, 726 S.E.2d at 665.
Id. at 173, 726 S.E.2d at 668.
Id. at 173-74, 726 S.E.2d at 668.
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-56.1 (2005).

179. Id.
180. 311 Ga. App.

99, 714 S.E.2d 742 (2011).
181. Id. at 101-02, 714 S.E.2d at 743-44.
182. Id. at 99-100, 714 S.E.2d at 742-43.
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and an attorney's certificate of no liens." The insurer's letter offered
to discuss a different release if the claimant preferred. The claimant
returned the check to the insurer on the ground that the insurer's
response constituted a counteroffer, not an acceptance. The insurer then
moved to enforce the settlement.'s4
The trial court granted the insurer's motion, and the court of appeals
affirmed.'" The court of appeals held that the insurer "unequivocally
accepted the offer to settle" and that the insurer's enclosure of a
proposed release "was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the
lawsuit" because the insurer did not condition the settlement upon use
of the proposed release and offered to discuss using a different release
if the claimant preferred." 6
In Kitchens v. Ezell,' the court of appeals confirmed that an offer
to settle may validly prescribe, as the sole means of acceptance, either
In
the making of a promise or the performance of conditions-'
Kitchens, the claimants wrote to an automobile liability insurer that if
the insurer sent a "bodily injury release of only your insured that
preserves my clients' claims for uninsured motorist coverage," a check,
and certain insurance information within twenty days, their claims
would be settled.8 9 In response, the insurer sent, inter alia, a release
that would have released "all claims, known and unknown" related to
the wreck. 90 The claimant then sued the insured, and the insured
moved to enforce the settlement.' 91
The trial court granted the insurer's motion. 92 The court of appeals
reversed, agreeing with the claimant that "(a) the [claimants'] settlement
offer could not be accepted by a promise of performance, only performance, and (b) [the insurer's] performance did not meet the terms of the
settlement offer" because the insurer had not sent the type of release
The court of appeals also rejected the
that the offer had specified.'
insurer's argument that it could not have simultaneously complied with
the claimant's demand and O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1(b), 94 which governs

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 100, 714 S.E.2d at 743.
Id.
Id. at 102, 714 S.E.2d at 744.
Id. at 101-02, 714 S.E.2d at 744.
315 Ga. App. 444, 726 S.E.2d 461 (2012).
Id. at 447, 726 S.E.2d at 464-65.
Id. at 445, 726 S.E.2d at 463 (emphasis added).
Id. at 445-46, 726 S.E.2d at 464.
Id. at 446-47, 726 S.E.2d at 464.
Id. at 447, 726 S.E.2d at 464.
Id. at 447-48, 726 S.E.2d at 464-65.
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1(b) (2005).
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limited releases. 9' In doing so, the court reaffirmed that the offeror
is the master of the offer, holding that even if "the [claimants'] offer
contemplated a legal impossibility ...it does not follow that [the
insurer] could accept something other than the offer made by [the
In other words, the insurer could accept the claimants'
claimants] .
offer, or reject it, but could not "accept" a hybrid blend of the claimants'
offer and the insurer's interpretation of governing law.'97
IV.

CONCLUSION

The above cases and legislation have in the Authors' estimation most
significantly affected trial practice and procedure in Georgia over the
survey period. This Article, however, is not intended to be exhaustive
of all legal developments for this topic.

195. Kitchens, 315 Ga. App. at 450-51, 726 S.E.2d at 467.
196. Id.
197. Id.

